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Euromepa v. Esmerian: The Scope of the Inquiry Into Foreign Law
When Evaluating Discovery Requests Under 28 U.S.C. sec.
1782

I.

Introduction
In the business community today, companies are striving to
become players in the global marketplace. As a result, international
litigation has become much more common. The volume of cases
where persons and information situated in the United States are the
subjects of litigation in foreign judicial systems has kept pace with the
growth of international litigation. The United States has had a system
for dealing with discovery requests from foreign jurisdictions since the
early days of the Republic.1 However in 1964, Congress drafted
amendments to 28 U.S.C. section 17822 to broaden the power of
district courts to render discovery assistance to foreign and international tribunals.
One of the goals of section 1782 was to provide efficient
assistance to foreign litigation,3 and courts have struggled to develop
consistent standards to evaluate applications for discovery under this
statute.4 In Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc.,5 the Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit considered this question and addressed the
appropriate factors that should be relied upon by a district court.6
The case involved a discovery request for information and depositions
pertaining to an appeal pending in France.7 The district court denied
the discovery request,8 but the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's decision.' Euromepa is important because the Second Circuit
considerably narrowed the scope of the inquiry into the foreign

I See Walter B. Stahr, Discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and International
Proceedings, 30 VA.J. INT'L L. 597, 600-605 (1990).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1988). This statute permits foreign tribunals and other interested
persons to apply to the district court for discovery of any person or information residing in
the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988).
3 See S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1964) [hereinafter Senate Report],
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3792-94.
4

See Hans Smit, Recent Developments in InternationalLitigation, 35 S. TEX. L.J. 215

(1994).
5 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995).
6 Id

7 Id.
8 See In re Application of Euromepa, S.A., 155 F.R.D. 80, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The
district court denied discovery because it found that allowing discovery would "infringe on
the French courts while not promoting the efficiency of the pending appeal in France." Id.
9 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1102.
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jurisdiction's procedural and substantive law.' ° In the Second
Circuit, district courts cannot conduct "extensive examinations of
foreign law regarding the existence and extent of discovery in the
foreign country."" Rather, a district court must grant the discovery
request unless there is a judicial, executive,2 or legislative declaration
that such assistance would be unwelcome.'
This Note will explore the facts and holding of Euromepa in Part
II.' Part III of this Note will explore the background law,' 4 and
Part IV will provide an analysis of the court's opinion."' Finally, this
Note will conclude that the Second Circuit's opinion does not place
enough importance on the nature and attitudes of the foreign
jurisdiction toward the U.S. approach to discovery, and removes too
much of the district court's discretion to determine whether to grant
the discovery request.' 6
II.

Statement of the Case

A. Facts
Euromepa, a French insurance brokerage firm, provided insurance
to ajewelry dealer who was selling certain jewelry owned by Esmerian,
a New York jewelry designer. 7 Euromepa represented to the dealer
that insurance for "infidelity of courier" was unnecessary because the
risk was so small with the selected courier. 8 Relying on that representation, the jewelry dealer changed its policy and dropped its coverage. 9 Jewelry valued at more than twenty-six million dollars was
never returned.2 ' The trial court found Euromepa liable to Esmerian
for over ten million dollars, and Euromepa appealed. 2 ' Euromepa
sought deposition and discovery of documents relating to the value of
the jewelry from Esmerian in the Southern District of New York under
section 1782.22

B. The District Court
In considering Euromepa's request, the district court was
10 Id.
I Id. at 1099.
12 Id. at 1100.
13
14

See infra notes 17-46 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 47-106 and accompanying text.

15 See infra notes 107-172 and accompanying text.
16

See infra notes 173-181 and accompanying text.

17 In re Application of Euromepa, S.A., 155 F.R.D. 80, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The jewelry
was to be shown for sale in the United Arab Emirates. Id.
Is Id.
19
20
21

Id.
Id.
Id. at 82.

22

Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1097 (2d Cir. 1995).
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compelled to consider the nature and attitudes of the French
government towards discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.23 After an inquiry into French discovery procedures, the
district court concluded that the French system did not allow parties
to seek discovery without judicial intervention.24 When making its
inquiry into the nature of French discovery procedures, the district
court considered the fact that Euromepa had not attempted to use the
French discovery process before applying for discovery pursuant to
section 1782.25 The district court held that granting the discovery
request would infringe on the power given to the French courts by
27
their legislature, 26 and therefore denied the petition.
C. The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the denial
of Euromepa's petition for discovery.28 The Second Circuit found
that the district court improperly followed prior case law, and that the
district court "misperceived the extent to which it should construe
foreign law in deciding whether to order discovery."'
Specifically,
the Second Circuit found that the district court's analysis placed too
much emphasis on Euromepa's failure to request discovery in France,
despite the district court's explicit rejection of the quasi-exhaustion

23 Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. at 82; see Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3792-94.
The district court also followed the direction of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
and considered "the balance between litigants that each nation creates within its own judicial
system." Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. at 82 (quoting In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d
54,-60 (2d Cir. 1993)).
24 Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. at 83.
25 Id. Nevertheless, the district court stated that it was not necessary for Euromepa to
exhaust all discovery requests in France before seeking discovery under section 1782. Id.
(citing In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992)).
26 Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. at 83. The district court determined that the
French system allowed very minimal pre-trial discovery. Unlike the American system, which
allows the parties to control the discovery process, the French system requires the judge to
order the production of each piece of evidence sought. If it granted the section 1782
petition, the district court believed that the discovery sought would be far more expansive
than that which the French procedure would allow. Id.
27 Id. at 84.
28 Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1102 (2d Cir. 1995). The court
acknowledged that it reviewed the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion, but
stated that "when the district court's analysis is decided on inappropriate grounds the
appellate court should reverse." Id. at 1097 (citing Malev HungarianAirlines, 964 F.2d at 99);
see also Independent Oil & Chem. Workers v. Proctor & Gamble, 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir.
1998) (stating that "abuse occurs... when an improper factor is relied upon"). But see Malev
HungarianAirlines, 964 F.2d at 104 (Feinburg, J., dissenting). Judge Feinburg stated that a
party challenging a district judge's exercise of discretion "can prevail only if there was no
reasonable basis for [its] decision." Id. (quoting SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18
(2d Cir. 1977)).
29 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1098.
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rule.3" The Second Circuit also stated that the district court gave too
much weight to the fact that the information requested would not have
been discoverable in France." The heart of the opinion, however,
concerned whether and to what extent the district court should inquire
into the foreign nation's procedural and substantive law in order to
determine if discovery assistance would offend the foreign tribunal.3 2
According to the Second Circuit, district courts should not
conduct an "extensive investigation" in order to determine the
"attitudes of foreign nations to outside discovery assistance.""3 Rather,
the district court should consider only "authoritative proof that the
foreign tribunal would reject evidence obtained with the aid of section
1782."" 4 This authoritative proof could be found in the forum's
'judicial, executive, or legislative declarations that specifically address
the use of evidence gathered under foreign proceedings."" If there
is no such declaration, then the district court should consider the
discovery request in light of the goal of providing efficient assistance
to foreign tribunals and litigants.3 " In Application of Euromepa, the
district court considered the French rules of procedure, and attempted
to gain a general understanding of the French attitude toward
discovery conducted in France.
There was no authoritative proof,
as defined by the Second Circuit, so the district court's determination
that discovery under section 1782 would offend the people of France
was unwarranted."
The Second Circuit concluded the opinion by stating that the
district court should remedy any concerns it has by issuing a "closely
tailored discovery order, rather than denying relief outright."" The
Second Circuit reasoned that the district court could force litigants to
submit all evidence gathered under section 1782 to the foreign
judiciary, in order to maintain the balance between the litigants
created by the French system of discovery.4 ° The district courts also
could address problems of reciprocity by forcing parties to exchange

30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.

Id.at 1099.
Id.

Id. at 1100.
35
36
37
38

Id.

Id. (citing Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3783).
In re Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. 80, 82-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1101.

39 Id.
40 Id. at 1102. In the French system, if a party requests discovery of evidence, then the
evidence must be introduced at the trial, whether or not it benefited the party's case. Id.
This is why the majority suggests that the district court use the power of the discovery order
to force the evidence gathered under section 1782 to be submitted to the French court. Id.
The dissent harshly criticized this suggestion, claiming that it simply forces a deluge of
unwanted information on the French court. Id. at 1103 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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information as a condition for granting discovery under section

1782.41
JudgeJacobs, writing in dissent, stated that the majority's opinion
removes too much of the district court's discretion that the statute was
designed to give.42 Judge Jacobs argued that discoverability was a
'useful tool," and rejected the majority's holding that its use was quite
limited. 43 According to the dissent, the district court should be
allowed to look into the nature and attitudes of the forum because the
purpose of the statute is to aid foreign tribunals, not to allow evasion
of their procedures."' JudgeJacobs argued that the majority removed
too much of the district court's discretion by requiring authoritative
proof that the forum would reject the evidence before the petition can
be denied. 45 The dissent also criticized the requirement that the
district court issue a closely tailored discovery order instead of denying
simply imported the entire discovery process to the
relief because 4 it
6
United States.

III. Background Law
In 1855, Congress enacted the first statute pertaining to discovery
for use in foreign proceedings, but this statute was "lost" and federal
courts never used it to aid foreign litigation.4 7 In 1865, Congress
passed another statute which allowed courts to compel testimony in
response to letters rogatory, but this statute was so limited that no
federal court provided discovery assistance to a foreign country
pursuant to this statute.48 In 1948 and 1949 Congress passed 28
U.S.C. section 1782, which allowed federal district courts to administer
depositions for use in foreign judicial proceedings.4 9
In 1964, Congress completely revised 28 U.S.C. section 1782 in
order to create a procedure that would provide for "wide judicial

41 Id. at 1102. The district court was extremely concerned that the foreign party would
get much broader discovery under section 1782 than the American party would be able to
obtain abroad. The Second Circuit insisted that rather than denying relief outright, district
courts should oversee the exchange of information between the parties. Id.
42 Id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 1103 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 1103-1104 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 1103 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 1104-1105 (Jacobs,J., dissenting). JudgeJacobs argued that the focus should
be on aiding the foreign tribunal's discovery, not taking over the entire discovery procedure.
Id.
47 Stahr, supra note 1, at 601.
48 Id. The statute only allowed the federal courts to provide assistance if "(i) the
United States and the foreign country were at peace, (ii) the foreign government was a party
to or had an 'interest' in the case, and (iii) the case was 'for recovery of money or property."'
Id. (quoting Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, § 1, 12 Stat. 769).
49 Stahr, supra note 1, at 603.
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assistance ... on a wholly unilateral basis"5" to foreign tribunals and
litigants involved in international litigation. The statute provides in
relevant part:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document
or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal. The order may be made pursuant to a ... request made by a
foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested

person .... "
One of the major changes in the statute was allowing "any interested
person" to apply for discovery in the United States. Prior to the
adoption of the 1964 amendments, only foreign judiciaries could
obtain such assistance. 2 The amended statute also provides that
unless the district court specifies otherwise, the discovery is to be
conducted in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5"
The legislative history states that after the amendments were
enacted, section 1782 was intended to provide "equitable and
efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved
in litigation with international aspects."54 Congress also hoped that
by providing such assistance, other countries would adopt similar
provisions for the benefit of U.S. tribunals and litigants.5 The Senate
Judiciary Committee's report states that the amendments were needed
to "render procedures in the U.S. more efficient, more effective, and
more economical."56 In furtherance of these principles, the statute
was intended to give district courts wide discretion in deciding whether
to grant discovery requests.5 7 However, appellate courts have limited
this discretion by determining what factors can be relied on when
considering whether to grant a section 1782 petition for discovery
assistance.
These
factors have included admissibility, reciprocity,
59
and discoverability
50
Id. at 604 (quoting Phillip W. Amram, PublicLaw No. 88-619 of October 3, 1964 - New
Developments in InternationalJudicialAssistance in the United States of America, 32 D.C. BARJ. 24,

28 (1965)).
51
52

28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988).
See Stahr, supra note 1, at 597 (quoting Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International

Litigation, 35 S. TEx. L.J. 215 (1994)).
53 Id. However, courts are given "complete discretion in prescribing the procedure to
be followed." Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3783.
54 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3783.
55
Id.
Id. at 3792.
Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564, 1565 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that "Congress
has given the district courts such broad discretion in granting judicial assistance to foreign
countries").
58
There has been much criticism of the courts' interpretation of section 1782, often
characterized as "reluctance in giving full effect to these policies." See Smit, supra note 4, at
229.
59 SeeJohn Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 134 (3rd. Cir. 1985) (holding that
56
57

a showing that the evidence sought was admissible in a foreign proceeding was not required
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In John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 6° the Third Circuit considered
what restraints might be placed on persons interested in foreign
litigation seeking discovery under section 1782.61 Specifically at issue
was the district court's holding that because Canadian law precluded
the use of letters rogatory and the evidence sought would not be
admissible in Canadian courts, the section 1782 petition should be
denied.6 2 The district court also concluded that granting discovery
would not enhance reciprocal discovery for United States litigants in
Canada.63 The Third Circuit held that section 1782 was intended to
provide broad assistance, but that it did not ignore "considerations of
comity and sovereignty that pervade international law."' The Third
Circuit acknowledged that relief should not be granted under section
1782 if the discovery order "trenched on the clearly established
procedures of a foreign tribunal."6'
Although section 1782 was
intended to inspire otherjurisdictions to reciprocate, the Third Circuit
held that reciprocity was not a requirement or a predicate to a grant
of discovery.66
In John Deere, the Third Circuit also stated that when an interested
person is seeking discovery under section 1782, the district court
should consider whether foreign discovery procedures are being
circumvented by application to U.S. courts.67 However, in that case,
the information sought was generally discoverable in Canada, and the
Third Circuit instructed the district court not to make a more
extensive inquiry.' Finally, the Third Circuit concluded that district
courts are not required to predict the admissibility of the evidence
sought to be discovered.69

and holding that the foreign jurisdiction need not provide reciprocal discovery assistance);
In re Application of Silvia Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
evidence need not be discoverable in the foreign court in order for the district court to grant
a section 1782 petition). But see Lo Ka Chun, 858 F.2d at 1566 (holding that evidence sought
under section 1782 must be discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction).
60 754 F.2d 132 (3rd. Cir. 1985).
61

Id. at 135.

62 Id. A letter rogatory, sometimes called a letter of request, is a "letter from one court
to another seeking official assistance." Stahr, supra note 1, at 600 n.12 (citing The Signe, 37
F. Supp 819, 820 (D. La. 1941)).
63 John Deere, 754 F.2d at 135.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. The court felt that, although reciprocity could inform a district court's
decision, the evidence was discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction, and therefore reciprocity
was not a concern in this case. Id. at 138.
67 Id. at 136; see Selas Corp. of Am. v. Elec. Furnace Co., 88 F.R.D. 75, 77 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (denying discovery request when it was doubtful whether evidence sought would be
discoverable in foreign jurisdiction).
68 John Deere, 754 F.2d at 136.
69 Id.; see also Shin v. United States, 555 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Letters
Rogatory from the Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1976). The
court in John Deere argued that the Canadian court would have to decide "the use to which
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In In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines,7" the Second
Circuit considered a Hungarian Airline company's application for
discovery under section 1782. 7' Malev Hungarian Airlines petitioned
the district court for discovery of United Technologies, an American
company that had sued Malev in Hungary for specific enforcement of
certain sales contracts. 72 In denying the discovery request, the district
court concluded that Malev should have first sought discovery in
Hungary, 71 that only foreign tribunals could seek discovery under
section 1782, 7 and that, if it granted the discovery request, there
would not be reciprocal discovery for the American plaintiff in
Hungary. 75 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the district
court relied on improper factors.76
The majority in Malev rejected the district court's assertion that
77
Malev should first have sought discovery in the Hungarian court.

They found nothing in the statute that would support "a quasi78
exhaustion requirement of the sort imposed by the district court."
The Second Circuit also found that such a quasi-exhaustion rule was
at odds with the twin aims of the statute - providing efficient assistance
to foreign tribunals and encouraging other countries to adopt similar
procedures. 79 It added an additional burden on litigants, even
though the goal of the statute was to provide more efficient assistance. 8s The Second Circuit found that requiring interested persons
first to apply to the forum court would not encourage other courts to
follow the United States' generous example.8 The Second Circuit
also rejected the district court's statement that only foreign tribunals
could request discovery assistance, because it believed the plain
language of the statute indicates that interested persons may seek

such evidence [was] put," and as long as the evidence was "for use in a foreign proceeding
which comports with notions of due process," the district court should grant the section 1782
petition. John Deere, 754 F.2d at 138.
70 964 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992).
71 Malev HungarianAirlines,
964 F.2d at 98.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 100.
74 Id. at 101.
75 Id. The district court was also extremely concerned about the additional burden
that would be placed on the U.S. district courts when presiding over section 1782 discovery
proceedings. Id. The majority of the Second Circuit rejected this as a basis for denying the
petition, stating that the district court could address this concern by imposing specific
conditions in the discovery order. Id. at 100 (citing Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3792-94).
76 Id.at 98.
77 Id. at 100.
78 Id. The majority also relied on John Deere, 754 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1985), where the

Third Circuit approved a discovery petition from a private litigant when they had not first
sought discovery in Canada. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text.

79 Malev HungarianAirlines, 964 F.2d at 100; see also Senate Report, supra note 3, at
3792-94.
80
81

Maerv HungarianAirlines, 964 F.2d at 100.

Id.
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discovery under section 1782.2 Finally, the majority in Malev rejected
the district court's reliance on the lack of reciprocity, holding that
section 1782 is "a one-way street" that grants broad assistance to other
forums, but "demands nothing in return." 3
Judge Feinburg, in his dissent, criticized the majority's opinion,
claiming that it would turn U.S. courts into "global Special Masters for
Discovery." 4 Judge Feinburg argued that section 1782 should be read
to provide assistance when the information is "necessary to foreign
litigation but beyond the power of the foreign court."" Since the
party against whom discovery was sought was the plaintiff in the
Hungarian litigation, that party would be completely bound by an
order of the Hungarian court.8 8 Therefore, according to the dissent,
granting the discovery order only served to circumvent Hungary's
discovery proceeding. 7 The dissent also argued that when the district
court was responsible for supervising protracted discovery it should be
able to consider whether the forum would allow reciprocal discov88
ery.
In In re Application of Asta Medica!9 the First Circuit held that
discoverability was a threshold requirement that had to be met before
a petition under section 1782 would be granted.9" The district court
in that case granted the petition for discovery, rejecting the
discoverability argument."' The First Circuit was concerned that a
U.S. litigant in a foreign tribunal would be at a "substantial disadvantage" if foreign litigants could obtain liberal U.S.-style discovery, but
American litigants could not.92 The First Circuit was also concerned
about foreign litigants using section 1782 "to circumvent foreign law
and procedures." " The court found that, without the discoverability
requirement, foreign countries might be offended by the United States
82

Id. at 101.
Id. (quoting Phillip W. Amram, The Proposed InternationalConvention on the Service of
Documents Abroad, 51 A.B.A.J. 650, 651 (1965)). Thus, the district court could grant Malev's
petition without also accepting responsibility for the other party's discovery. Id. at 101-102.
84 Id. at 103 (Feinburg,J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 105 (Feinburg, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the district court did
not mechanically require exhaustion, but that Malev had failed to show any need for section
1782 assistance. Id. (Feinburg, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 105 (Feinburg,J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 105 (Feinburg,J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that section 1782 was
intended to allow efficient assistance in seeking limited amounts of evidence, i.e. bank
records that were beyond the power of the foreign court. Malev's petition for discovery was
viewed by Judge Feinburg as totally replacing the Hungarian discovery system with U.S.-style
discovery - something that the statute was not designed to permit. Id. at 105-106 (Feinburg,
83

J., dissenting).
dissenting).
Id. at 105 (Feinburg, J.,
981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
Application of Asia Medica, 981 F.2d at 7.
In re Application of Asta Medica, 794 F. Supp. 442, 443 (D. Me. 1992).
Application of Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 5.
93 Id. at 6.
88
89
90
91
92
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granting discovery for use in theirjurisdiction in contravention of their
laws.94 The First Circuit stated that section 1782 was not intended to
provide litigants with the opportunity to "side-step" a foreign country's
law prohibiting the use of certain information by "rushing here and
obtaining the information under section 1782." 9" The court found
that this would defeat one of the purposes of the statute, which was to
encourage foreign nations to adopt provisions similar to section
1782.96
In In re Application of Silvia Gianoli Aldunate,9 7 the district court
granted a petition for discovery pursuant to section 1782 for use in a
Chilean incompetency proceeding."
The defendant appealed,
claiming that the plaintiff failed to make the required threshold
showing that the discovery would have been available in the foreign
jurisdiction.99 The Second Circuit considered the text of section 1782
and found three requirements: (1) that the person against whom
discovery was sought reside in the United States; (2) that the discovery
be for use in a foreign proceeding; and (3) that the applicant be a
foreign or international tribunal or interested person. °° The Second
Circuit found that these requirements were met, and that there was
nothing in the text that implied a discoverability requirement.' O'
The Second Circuit rejected other circuits' recognition of a
discoverability requirement, 1 2 but stated that discoverability was a
"useful tool" in the district court's exercise of discretion under section
1782."' Gianoli echoed the holding in Malev, that the twin aims of
section 1782, as expressed in the legislative history, must inform a
determination of whether to grant discovery.'0 4 After making an
inquiry into the laws of the forum, the district court found that a grant
of discovery would not circumvent Chilean procedure, nor offend
Chile's sovereignty.'
The Second Circuit held that this inquiry was

94
95
96

97

Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.

3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993).
Id. at 55. The Chilean court had ordered the parties to conduct a complete
inventory of all of the potential incompetents' assets, and the discovery sought under section
1782 pertained to assets which were located in the United States. Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 58-59; see 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988).
101 Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 59.
102 Id.; see supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
103 Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 60.
104 Id. at 61 (quoting In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100
(2d Cir. 1992)).
105 Id. The district court found that "litigants in Chile are not prohibited from
gathering evidence through methods that are lawful in the place where those methods are
undertaken." Id. Combined with the fact that granting the section 1782 petition would help
the Chilean court compile "a complete inventory" of the incompetent's assets, these factors
indicated that neither Chilean sovereignty nor the Chilean court would be offended by
98
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sufficient to satisfy the twin
aims, and therefore the district court did
06
not abuse its discretion.
IV.

Significance of the Case

Judge Calabresi, writing for the majority, began the opinion in
Euromepa by reaffirming the principle that district courts are to
"evaluate discovery requests under section 1782 in light of the statute's
'twin aims.'""07 The majority held that the district court's analysis
"runs counter to the principles set forth in Malev, Aldunate, John Deere,
08
Ltd., and, we believe, in the statute itself."
The court first took issue with the district court's statement that
Euromepa "failed to even attempt to use the mechanism provided by
French procedure for obtaining documents."" ° The Second Circuit
viewed this as a "quasi-exhaustion" requirement of the type that was
expressly rejected by the Second Circuit in Malev." ° Although it did
not expressly state this, the Second Circuit appears to have taken the
Malev holding to an extreme. In Malev, the Second Circuit rejected
the district court's conclusion that the section 1782 petition was
premature and unnecessary because application had not first been
made to the forum court."' In Euromepa, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's statement that it considered Euromepa's failure
to apply to the French court relevant only-to a determination of the2
"nature and attitudes" of the French government toward discovery."
The Euromepa decision marks a definite shift from the Malev holding
that district courts cannot predicate the denial of a section 1782
petition on the failure to apply to the forum court for discovery.
Euromepa directs the district court to not consider the circumstances
surrounding the petitioner's application." 4
The Euromepacourt also found the district court's inquiry into the
nature and attitudes to be a test to determine if the evidence would be

section 1782 discovery. Id.
106

Id.

107 Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1097 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing In re
Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
179 (1992)).
108 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1098.
109 Id. (quoting In re Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. 80, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
110 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1097 (citing Application of Malev HungarianAirlines, 964 F.2d at

100).
III Malev HungarianAirlines, 964 F.2d at 100.
112 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1098 (quoting Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. at 83).
113 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1098; Malev HungarianAirlines, 964 F.2d at 101.
114 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1098. The dissent argued that the legislative history specifically
charged the district court to make an inquiry into the nature and attitudes of the forum, and
that district courts should consider all relevant information when making such a determination. Id. at 1103 (Jacobs,J., dissenting).
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The Second Circuit stated that the
discoverable in France." 5
discoverability of the evidence was of "quite limited" relevance to the
evaluation of a petition under section 1782,116 and, when coupled
with the "impermissible factor" of quasi-exhaustion, it did not
constitute grounds for denying the petition." 7 The dissent criticized
the majority's imposition of the "quite limited relevance" standard for
The court in Gianoli had held that, although
discoverability."a
discoverability was not a prerequisite for granting a section 1782
request,"9 it was a "'useful tool' for the district judge in exercising
discretion."12
Without explanation, the Euromepa court severely
limited the impact of Gianoli as it pertained to the discoverability of the
2
evidence.1 '
The district court's approach in Application of Euromepaattempted
to strike a balance between the "twin aims" of section 1782.122 It did
not attempt to set up rigorous tests for granting a request for discovery,
rather it considered all the evidence available before exercising
discretion in granting the petition.12 One issue that the majority of
the Second Circuit dismissed was the suggestion that section 1782 is
designed to render assistance, but not to allow United States courts to
completely take over discovery in a foreign proceeding. 24 Judge
Feinburg, dissenting in Malev, wrote that section 1782 had been
traditionally used "to seek limited amounts of evidence (commonly
bank records) from third parties in this country not subject to the
jurisdiction of the foreign court."125 Euromepa was seeking "broad
gauge, category by category, American-style discovery." 126 The dissent
argued that it was reasonable for the district court to consider the
when exercising its discretion to deny
availability of French procedures
27
the section 1782 petition.'
In addition, the district court relied on the need to prevent

115 Id. at 1098.

116
117

Id.
Id.

118 Id. at 1103 (JacobsJ., dissenting).
19 Id. (JacobsJ., dissenting). But see In reApplication ofAsta Medica, 981 F.2d 1, 7 (lst
Cir. 1992); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988); Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564, 1566
(11th Cir. 1988).
120 Euromepa,51 F.3d at 1103. (Jacobs,J., dissenting) (citing In reApplication of Gianoli,
3 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1993)).
121

Id. at 1098.

122 In reApplication of Euromepa, S.A., 155 F.R.D. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
123

Id.

124 The majority considered any reference to an available "mechanism" for discovery in
the foreign country to be a quasi-exhaustion requirement. Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1098.
125 In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir.
1992) (Feinburg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992).
126 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1103 (Jacobs,J., dissenting).
127 Id. (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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circumvention of foreign discovery procedures, a valid policy concern

recognized in Gianoli.128 The district court's consideration of the
fact that Euromepa was seeking to use American discovery "as a
substitute for discovery in France rather than as an aid and supplement
to the procedures of a French tribunal" was an application of the
Gianoli test."2 In Euromepa, the majority recognized that the district
court was attempting to inquire about whether "granting this petition
would be an unwarranted intrusion into France's system of evidence
gathering."'
In Gianoli, the Second Circuit approved the discovery
order because the district court "clearly made an inquiry into whether
its grant of discovery ... would circumvent Chilean restrictions on
discovery and whether its grant of discovery would be an affront to the
Chilean court or to Chilean sovereignty."' 3 ' The court in Euromepa
considered the issue left unresolved in Gianoli- the "appropriate scope
of this 'inquiry' into the likelihood that providing section
1782
32
assistance to foreign litigants will offend a foreign tribunal."'
The Second Circuit stated that "an extensive examination of
foreign law regarding the existence and extent of discovery in the
forum country was not desirable."' 33
The court relied on a law
review article which stated that the drafters believed that it would be
"wholly inappropriate for an American district court to try to obtain [a
broad understanding of the subtleties of the application of the foreign
system] for the purpose of honoring a simple request for assistance." "
This passage was a justification for granting section 1782 requests
when the production of the evidence could not be compelled under
foreign law. However, the majority quoted this language as supporting
a limited inquiry into the "existence and extent of discovery" in the
foreign nation.3 5 The issue that the district court considered in this
case was not whether the evidence could be "compelled" by the foreign
jurisdiction, but whether the nature and attitudes of the foreign nation
would be adverse to the grant of discovery.3 6 When production of
128 In re Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting In re
Application of Gianoli 3 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1993)). The court in Gianoliheld that avoiding
circumvention of foreign restrictions on discovery was a legitimate policy concern, and that
it should be addressed by the district court's exercise of discretion. Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 60.
129 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1103 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
130 51 F.3d at 1098 (quoting In re Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. 80, 84 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
131 Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 61.
132 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1099. The majority does not include inquiries into whether a
grant of discovery under section 1782 would circumvent the foreign country's restrictions
on discovery in its formulation of the issue presented in this case. Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. (quoting Smit, supra note 4, at 235). Smit also argues that the drafters believed
countries which did not have American-style discovery would still welcome the assistance of
the American judicial system. Smit, supra note 4, at 235.
135 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1099.
136 In re Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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evidence cannot be compelled by the foreign court because the party
or evidence is found in the United States, then there is a stronger case
for not making an extensive inquiry into the nature and attitudes of
the foreign country. 1 7 The limited inquiry permitted in Euromepa
does not allow consideration of the fact that the evidence sought by
Euromepa was quite vast and that the French discovery system
permitted very little pre-trial discovery."
The majority in Euromepa looked to the Third Circuit's opinion
in John Deere v. Sperry for additional support for the limited inquiry into
foreign law.' 3 1 In John Deere, the Third Circuit held that the legislative history concerning the inquiry into the nature and attitudes of the
forum country "authorized district courts to scrutinize the underlying
fairness of the foreign proceedings to insure that they comply with
notions of due process." 4 ' The court stated that it was "doubtful'
that the statute imposed a requirement that the district courts "predict
or construe the procedural or substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction."41

In Euromepa, the majority approved of the Third Circuit's

explanation that "to require a district court to undertake more
extensive inquiry into the laws of the foreign jurisdiction would seem
"
to exceed the proper scope of section 1782.

,142

The majority opinion did not consider the context of the John
Deere quote when it used it as authority for requiring a limited
inquiry. 4 ' The Third Circuit stated that a "more extensive inquiry"
would be beyond the scope of section 1782,'4 but the court in
Euromepa did not discuss the level of inquiry that the John Deere court
supported. In John Deere, the court stated that it did not "countenance
the use of U.S. discovery to evade the limitations placed on domestic
pre-trial disclosure by foreign tribunals."'4 5 The Third Circuit further
stated that concern about circumvention of foreign discovery procedures by American courts' granting of discovery orders was "particularly pronounced" when an individual litigant made the request for
137 See In reApplication of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1992)
(Feinburg,J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992). This is precisely the situation that
Judge Feinburg believed would justify invocation of section 1782, because the party seeking
discovery could not obtain the assistance of the foreign court. Id. (Feinburg, J.,dissenting).
13 See Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1104 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting). Judge Jacobs argues that the
Second Circuit in Gianoli held that the foreign nation's attitude toward discovery was
.appropriate and useful." Id. (JacobsJ., dissenting) (citing In reApplication of Gianoli, 3 F.3d
54, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1993).
139 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1099.
140 John Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry, 754 F.2d 132, 136, n.3 (3d Cir. 1985).
141
Id. It is important to note that the district court did not attempt to predict or
construe foreign law, rather it simply informed itself of the basic discovery procedures
available in France. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
142 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1099 (quotingJohn Deere, 754 F.2d at 136).
143 Id.
144 John Deere, 754 F.2d at 136.
145 Id.
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assistance. 146 Thus, in John Deere, the court felt that an inquiry that
considered more than whether the granting of discovery might
circumvent the foreign countries' discovery procedures would not be
countenanced by section 1782.117 The Euromepa court did not
consider the circumvention issue, and stated that district courts should
not attempt to "glean the accepted practices and attitudes of foreign
nations."'48 This decision, while it accepts the analysis used in John
Deere, fails to recognize that some understanding of the foreign
country's discovery procedures is necessary in order to satisfy the
49
inquiry required in John Deere.1

The Euromepa court recognized the principle that "[a] grant of
discovery that trenched upon the clearly established procedures of a
foreign tribunal would not be within section 1782. ""'° The court
defined "clearly established" by holding that the "district court's
inquiry into the discoverability of the requested materials should
consider only authoritative proof that a foreign tribunal would reject
evidence obtained with the aid of section 1782."' The court stated
that authoritative proof would be "embodied in a forum country's
judicial, executive, or legislative declarations that specifically address
the use of evidence gathered under foreign proceedings." 5 ' If there
is not authoritative proof, then the interest in providing efficient
assistance to foreign tribunals should inform the district court's
15
opinion.

1

The Second Circuit did not rely on prior case law when it created
the "authoritative proof' test. 54 However, the court framed the issue
referring to the "inquiry" into the nature and attitudes of the foreign
tribunal that was conducted in Gianoli.'55 In Gianoli, the Second
Circuit approved of the district court's inquiry into Chilean discovery
procedures. 5 6 Specifically, the Second Circuit approved of the
district court's determination that Chilean law prohibits litigants "from
gathering evidence through methods that are lawful in the place where

146

Id.

147 Id.
148 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1099.
149 See John Deere, 754 F.2d at 135.
'5

Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1099 (quoting John Deere, 754 F.2d at 135).

151 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1100.

152 Id. The opinion cites South Carolina Insurance Co. v. Assurantie MaatschappiJ "De
Zeven Provincien" N.V., 1987 App. Cas. 24 (H.L.(E). 1987) as an example of an authoritative
statement. Id. In this case, the British House of Lords stated that discovery under section
1782 was not so oppressive as to justify an injunction by the lower court. Maatschappi, 1987

App. Cas. at 45.
153 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1100.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1098-99.
156 In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 1993).
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those methods are undertaken."" 7 The Euromepa court's authoritative proof test is not consistent with the inquiry that was specifically
approved by the Second Circuit in Gianoli. The district court in Gianoli
made a calculated inquiry into Chilean discovery, faithfully attempting
to determine if a grant of discovery would circumvent Chilean law or
offend the people of Chile.'
The Euromepa decision, however, does
not follow the reasoning of Gianoli,so district courts must now confine
their inquiries to only "authoritative proof' that the forum would reject
the assistance of the U.S. court. 5 9
The dissent criticized the authoritative proof requirement because
it does not avoid the "entanglement of American courts into the
subtleties of foreign law."" 6 Judge Jacobs reasoned that it would not
be easy for American courts to determine if foreign declarations are
authoritative and "whether they authoritatively dispose of a particular
petition for discovery." '61 The majority's opinion offered some
support for this conclusion when it stated that a district judge faced
with an authoritative declaration "would still have to compare the facts
of the case then currently before the court to the foreign precedent
cited by the party opposing the section 1782 discovery and determine
whether the two contexts are sufficiently analogous to warrant a denial
of discovery."162 After limiting the scope of the district court's
inquiry to a consideration of only authoritative proof, Euromepa then
required the district court to do something that it earlier stated was
beyond the scope of section 1782 - to "construe the procedural or
substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction. " "'
Because the district court did not rely on authoritative declarations, the Second Circuit rejected its conclusion that a grant of
discovery would offend the people of France."6 The Second Circuit
concluded that district judges should not place much weight on the
sovereignty interest of the forum nation.' 65 When explaining this
assertion, the court stated that the French court could protect itself by
issuing an injunction to stop discovery, or by excluding the evidence
gathered in foreign discovery proceedings."6 The court added that
if the forum nation was offended, then it would inspire the authorita157

Id.

158

Id.

Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1100. It is possible that the Second Circuit could distinguish
Gianoli by deciding that the district court's determination that Chile would accept U.S.
assistance was based on "authoritative proof."
160 Id. at 1104 (Jacobs. J.,
dissenting).
161 Id. (Jacobs. J.,
dissenting).
159

162

Id. at 1100 n.4.

163

Id, at 1099 (quoting John Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry, 754 F.2d 132, 136 n.3 (3d Cir.

1985)).
164 Id.at
165 Id.
16

Id.

1101.
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tive declarations that 67district judges could use to avoid additional

offense in the future.1

This reasoning is not consistent with the "considerations of comity
and sovereignty that pervade international law" specifically embodied
in section 1782."6 The Second Circuit's decision ignores these
fundamental principles, and instead challenges other countries to
prove that they do not want the assistance of United States district
courts. In addition, the Second Circuit suggested that district courts
would benefit from the guidance provided by an offended tribunal's
authoritative declaration that it will not accept the discovery provided
by section 1782. I" In this way, the Second Circuit requires district
courts to conduct the analysis backwards: only after the forum has been
offended will the principle of sovereignty be afforded any consideration when deciding a section 1782 petition.
The majority concluded its opinion by offering guidance on the
process the district court should use in addressing concerns about
granting the discovery order. The Second Circuit stated that the
district judge should exercise his discretion by "issuing a closely
tailored discovery order rather than by denying relief outright."' 7°
Thus, the districtjudge could solve the problems that might arise if the
forum does not have reciprocal discovery procedures by requiring the
parties to exchange information. 17' The dissent argued that this
formulation "effectively limits the district court's statutory discretion
to the crafting
of discovery orders rather than the denial of relief
172
outright."

V.

Conclusion
The legislative history states that the purpose of section 1782 is to
provide efficient discovery assistance to foreign jurisdictions and to
influence them to adopt similar provisions,17 1 but it also states that
a district court should look into the nature and attitudes of the foreign
nation in order that the grant of discovery not offend the forum. 74
Courts have attempted to harmonize these two competing interests,
and to create meaningful standards to guide district courts' discretion
when reviewing petitions under section 1782.
The majority in Euromepa greatly reduces the importance of the
nature and attitudes of the forum, and instead focuses on the stated

167

Id.

168 John Deere, Ltd. v. Sperry, 754 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
169 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1101.
170 Id.

171 Id.at 1102.
172 Id.at 1102 (Jacobs J.,
dissenting).
173 Senate Report, supra note 3,at 3792-94.
174 Id.
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purpose of providing efficient assistance. After the holding in
Euromepa, only authoritative proof that the forum would reject the
discovery assistance will allow the district court to reject a petition.
The dissent focuses more on the interest of the forum, and seems to
put these two competing interests on equal footing. This balance is
accomplished by allowing the district court complete discretion in
deciding which of these interests should be given greater weight
according to the specific facts of the case.
The dissent's argument is much more consistent with Second
Circuit precedent. The Euromepa decision represents a substantial
limitation on the discretion of the district court. Such a denial of
discretion is contrary to the holding in Gianoli, that concerns about
discoverability should be addressed by the exercise of the district
courts' discretion.1 75
The district court analyzed Euromepa's
petition with an eye toward all the circumstances surrounding the
application. The district court did not deny the petition because
Euromepa failed to meet any specific prerequisite; rather, the district
court denied the petition after a thorough inquiry
into the nature and
176
attitudes of French tribunals toward discovery.
The majority's holding creates a new threshold test that a district
court must meet before it can deny a petition under section 1782 that there is authoritative proof that the forum will reject the assistance. 177 In the past, the Second Circuit has rejected any prerequisite for granting a petition under section 1782.178 In this case, the
Second Circuit's only justification for its imposition of a threshold test
for a denial of a section 1782 is the efficiency of the proceeding. 79
This bright line standard not only removes the district court's
discretion, but it totally ignores the interest of the forum. If the
purpose of the statute is to provide efficient assistance to the forum,
then the district court should not be required to impose American-style
discovery on a foreign nation. A true inquiry into the nature and
attitudes of the foreign jurisdiction, like the one conducted in Gianoli,
would reveal whether restrictions on pre-trial discovery were being
circumvented, or whether the district court was providing efficient and
desired assistance.
Section 1782 was intended to be a cooperative statute.' 80 The
Euromepadecision has turned this statute into a powerful tool allowing
foreign litigants to replace their own country s discovery procedures

175 In re Application of Gianoli, 3 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1993).
176 In re Application of Euromepa, 155 F.R.D. 80, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
177 Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1995).

178 See Gianoli, 3 F.3d at 60; In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97,
101 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 179 (1992).
179 Euromepa, 51 F.3d at 1100.
180 John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry, 754 F.2d 132, 135 (3rd Cir. 1985).
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with the Federal Rules. This decision has created a great difference in
the treatment a foreign litigant will receive, depending on the circuit
in which they bring their request for discovery assistance.' 8' Instead
of inspiring other circuits to follow the United States' generous
example, Euromepa encourages confrontation with other judiciaries.
This decision marks a departure from prior case law, and it will greatly
change the tenor of international litigation. Although the Supreme
Court has been unwilling to grant certiorari to cases interpreting
section 1782, perhaps the Euromepa decision creates sufficient discord
between the circuits, as well as between the United States and other
nations, to warrant Supreme Court review.
RICHARD D. HAYGOOD

181 See, e.g., In meApplication of Asta Medica, 981 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1992) (where litigants
are required to show that the information sought would be discoverable in the forum
country).

